For the National Museum of American History

There is more fine work today by the WSJ graphics department in this story about the growing tentacles of the subprime mess (well, actually, the tentacles aren't growing anymore - the major growth occurred a few years ago and now it's more like the tentacles are being chopped off all around the country).

Click on the graphic to go to the interactive version at the WSJ

Someone really ought to find an original New Century rate sheet and submit it to the National Museum of American History - they probably have one of those sock-puppets from Pets.com, why not one of these?

The report details how, earlier in the decade, borrowers increasingly found themselves in subprime loans for one reason or another, such as, they had no money for a down payment or they really couldn't afford the place that they were going to "flip" in six months anyway.

An analysis for The Wall Street Journal of more than $2.5 trillion in subprime loans made since 2000 shows that as the number of subprime loans mushroomed, an increasing proportion of them went to people with credit scores high enough to often qualify for conventional loans with far better terms.
...
The surprisingly high number of subprime loans among more credit-worthy borrowers shows how far such mortgages have spread into the economy -- including middle-class and wealthy communities where they once were scarce. They also affirm that thousands of borrowers took out loans -- perhaps foolishly -- with little or no documentation, or no down payment, or without the income to qualify for a conventional loan of the size they wanted.

The analysis also raises pointed questions about the practices of major mortgage lenders. Many borrowers whose credit scores might have qualified them for more conventional loans say they were pushed into risky subprime loans. They say lenders or brokers aggressively marketed the loans, offering easier and faster approvals -- and playing down or hiding the onerous price paid over the long haul in higher interest rates or stricter repayment terms.

Just another example of what Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson characterized as "innovation outrunning the government's ability to deal with it".

If the rate sheet were to be accepted by the museum, they could probably find a place for it near this display showing one of the alternative forms of "money" used during The Great Depression as seen on our last trip eastward.

Surely there are some interesting parallels between depression-era clamshell money and the troubles that are being seen with the mortgage mess today - none seem to come to mind at the moment.