Wikinvest Wire

Becoming a banana republic

Monday, March 30, 2009

This week's must-read commentary on the continuing financial crisis was penned by Simon Johnson and appears in the The Atlantic - The Quiet Coup. It should be familiar material for anyone who's read any of Kevin Phillips' recent books or earlier work by Paul Kennedy.

In its depth and suddenness, the U.S. economic and financial crisis is shockingly reminiscent of moments we have recently seen in emerging markets (and only in emerging markets): South Korea (1997), Malaysia (1998), Russia and Argentina (time and again). In each of those cases, global investors, afraid that the country or its financial sector wouldn’t be able to pay off mountainous debt, suddenly stopped lending. And in each case, that fear became self-fulfilling, as banks that couldn’t roll over their debt did, in fact, become unable to pay. This is precisely what drove Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy on September 15, causing all sources of funding to the U.S. financial sector to dry up overnight. Just as in emerging-market crises, the weakness in the banking system has quickly rippled out into the rest of the economy, causing a severe economic contraction and hardship for millions of people.

But there’s a deeper and more disturbing similarity: elite business interests—financiers, in the case of the U.S.—played a central role in creating the crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the inevitable collapse. More alarming, they are now using their influence to prevent precisely the sorts of reforms that are needed, and fast, to pull the economy out of its nosedive. The government seems helpless, or unwilling, to act against them.
This is all, apparently, a natural progression throughout history.

Unfortunately, not enough people in Washington and on Wall Street read enough history.

Some argue that the real Reagan Revolution was the reckless expansion of credit, a development that gave us 20 years of faux prosperity while enriching Wall Street and Mr. Johnson is clearly in that camp.
Top investment bankers and government officials like to lay the blame for the current crisis on the lowering of U.S. interest rates after the dotcom bust or, even better—in a “buck stops somewhere else” sort of way—on the flow of savings out of China. Some on the right like to complain about Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, or even about longer-standing efforts to promote broader homeownership. And, of course, it is axiomatic to everyone that the regulators responsible for “safety and soundness” were fast asleep at the wheel.

But these various policies—lightweight regulation, cheap money, the unwritten Chinese-American economic alliance, the promotion of homeownership—had something in common. Even though some are traditionally associated with Democrats and some with Republicans, they all benefited the financial sector. Policy changes that might have forestalled the crisis but would have limited the financial sector’s profits—such as Brooksley Born’s now-famous attempts to regulate credit-default swaps at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, in 1998—were ignored or swept aside.

The financial industry has not always enjoyed such favored treatment. But for the past 25 years or so, finance has boomed, becoming ever more powerful. The boom began with the Reagan years, and it only gained strength with the deregulatory policies of the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. Several other factors helped fuel the financial industry’s ascent. Paul Volcker’s monetary policy in the 1980s, and the increased volatility in interest rates that accompanied it, made bond trading much more lucrative. The invention of securitization, interest-rate swaps, and credit-default swaps greatly increased the volume of transactions that bankers could make money on. And an aging and increasingly wealthy population invested more and more money in securities, helped by the invention of the IRA and the 401(k) plan. Together, these developments vastly increased the profit opportunities in financial services.
IMAGE Not surprisingly, Wall Street ran with these opportunities. From 1973 to 1985, the financial sector never earned more than 16 percent of domestic corporate profits. In 1986, that figure reached 19 percent. In the 1990s, it oscillated between 21 percent and 30 percent, higher than it had ever been in the postwar period. This decade, it reached 41 percent. Pay rose just as dramatically. From 1948 to 1982, average compensation in the financial sector ranged between 99 percent and 108 percent of the average for all domestic private industries. From 1983, it shot upward, reaching 181 percent in 2007.

The great wealth that the financial sector created and concentrated gave bankers enormous political weight—a weight not seen in the U.S. since the era of J.P. Morgan (the man). In that period, the banking panic of 1907 could be stopped only by coordination among private-sector bankers: no government entity was able to offer an effective response. But that first age of banking oligarchs came to an end with the passage of significant banking regulation in response to the Great Depression; the reemergence of an American financial oligarchy is quite recent.
Somehow, this makes all of the attempts to restore the proper functioning of credit markets a bit less reassuring - it goes on at great length and is well worth reading in its entirety.


Anonymous said...

That's funny. Restore what? The credit markets are trying to function properly. Crap that shouldn't get funded doesn't get money. There is plenty of capital still left for good projects with low risk and high rates of return.

Anonymous said...

The problem is not due to lack of knowledge or awareness. The problem is with democracy. As part of administration, you must appease public to get reelected. Public are happy for all give-aways provided they believe they are not going to pay for it. As part of govt, you must keep giving stuff while fooling public that they actually are not paying for it. If Obama really acts according to text book, not many people appreciate the results.

bevo said...

I saw the piece over the weekend. The better part of the article appears toward the end when the author includes views from former IMF officials. We are a Argentina, and Russia, and the Ukraine, and every country with financial sector.

To lay blame at the feat of Paul Volker though is to either misread or misunderstand history. If we had followed Volker's approach of limiting the flows of M1, M2, and M3, then we probably would have avoided much of the asset bubble economy.

Much of the last 10 or 15 years of economic growth follows a similar approach for much of the 1970s when easy credit coursed through the American economy. The lack of inflation in the 1990s compared to the 1970s speaks more to American wages failing to rise. Instead, we relied on personal debt to fuel our purchases in the 1990s rather than income in the 1970s.

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